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EKE?ACB
My desire to investigate the circumstances surrounding the
small "businessman was stimulated by the fact that many men returning
from the military services have started their own "businesses and hope
to survive.
Since there may he a high rate of failure among these new
enterprises, I have set out to determine what the sources of assistance
are for "businesses in this category. A "brief survey of the field
revealed that private aid is limited, hence I turned to the Government
and there found a numher of Federal and State laws designed to protect
and aid small "businesses.
I cannot here discuss all of the measures which have "been
introduced during the period from 1932 to the present, hut a careful
examination of all of those that have "become Law, and especially those
that have or are capahle of having a direct effect upon small "business
prohlems, has "been made.
In this paper I have chosen to discuss the P.obinson-Patman Act
and its relationship to the small retailer. This Act has received severe
criticisms from "both economic and legal analysts. They charge that it is
amhiguous, unworkable and does not accomplish the purposes for which it
was written. These charges are denied "by the proponents of the Act. The
latter .group contends that the bill regulates "business activity, promotes
free competition and enables the small retailer to maintain a fair share
of the distribution market.

2The first chapter of this thesis is devoted to a study of the
economic conditions in the retail field prior to the enactment of the
Robins on-Patman Law. The reason for making this background study is to
determine what the factors were that caused the agitation for changes in
the existing lews. The second chapter presents the text of the Rcbinscn-
Patman Act and outlines it3 purposes. Chapter III contains the pro and
con arguments about the Law. These are presented for the purpose of
ascertaining which of its aspects are controversial and why. In Chapter
IV there is an abbreviated report of the leading cases tried under the
Act, and lists of rulings which have "been made "by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Supreme Court. The reason for presenting these cases
is, to show how this Law is interpreting' "by those who have the duty of
administerihg^ it. Chapter V consists of a summary of the findings in
this study and my conclusions, based upon the facts as presented.
B.W.P.
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CHAPPIE I
THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND TO TEE ROBINSOIT-PATMAIT ACT
The Sherman Ant i-trust Act and the Clayton Act were the first
Lows passed by the United States Congress which were designed to prevent
the domination of commerce and trade "by large "business organizations. The
Clayton Act has, for more than 20 years, "been the main Federal Law governing
price diffrentials in interstate commerce. Its provisions were adequately
understood "by all who were concerned, Therefore very little trouble was
had in administering it.
At the time the Cleytcn Act "became law, there did not exist the
problem of regulating retail distribution, therefore its provisions were
not directed to this end. Although chain organizations were in existence
as early as 1330, they were not recognised as s prohahle source from which
economic mal-adjustments could arise.
Between the years of 1918 to 1932 the chain store movement
spread rapidly and invaded the field of retail distribution with a tremen-
dous impact. During the course of the chain store expansion, many small
independent dealers were either forced out of "business entirely or found
thPir profit margins reduced to a minimum.
The independent merchants "became annoyed with the methods used
"by chains in acquiring trade and rendering services to the "buying public.
Therefore, they demanded aid from the Government . As "before stated, the
Clayton Act was the only existing lav; which dealt with unlawful trade
practices, and it did not designate specifically what actions were unlawful,
nor did it outline in detail what types of organization over v;hich it had
jurisdiction.

Because of these, and many other weaknesses, not herein named, the chain
organizations could successfully avoid the Clayton Act and carry on without
restrictions.
In 1928 the complaints against chains "became so numerous, Congress
authorized the Federal Trade Commission tc make an investigation of all
chain-store activities and to submit periodic reports at each session of
Congress. In a later session, Congress appointed a Committee, headed "by
Representative Fatman, to investigate the lobby group known as the American
Retail Federation, to see if its contentions were made in good faith.
The findings of the above-mentioned investigations formed the
groundwork for the formation of the Robinscn-Patman Act.
A. SIZE USD EXTEI1T OF THE CHAIN STORE SYSTEM
First, let us examine the chain store holdings to determine
actually how large they were, and how much of the retail field they
controlled.
According to the census reports,! there were in operation in
the United States, in 1929, 1,5^3,158,000 retail stores with a total sales
of over $^9, 000, COO, 000. These stores were classified into various groups
according to methods of operation. The principal groups being designated
as single stores (independents), two and three store independents (local
"branch systems operated from a dominant parent store), local chains (four
or more local stores with a central warehouse) sectional chains (with
stores in more than one city "but entirely in one geographical area), and
national chains (with stores in more than one section of the country)
.
1. U.S. Bureau of the census- Sec. on retail distribution-1930

There were 7,Q6q1 chain store organizations in I925 operating
15S » ^38 stores or shout 10/& of all the retail stores in the country.
Sales of these chains aggregated over ten-hillion dollars or ahout 22$
of the total annual retail sales. Local chains operated 52,^65 stores
with a total annual sales of three-hillion dollars; sectional chains
operated 1+1,^65 stores and had sales of a little over two billion dollars;
while national chains operated 51*058 stores with sales of three Diliion
nine million dollars annually. Other types of chains^ not included in
this class operated 15,032 stores with sales of one "billion two million
dollars.
A tahulation of these figures shows that chains comprise 9»^$
of the total number of stores and made 19.2$ of the total annual sales.
In short, 20 cents out of every dollar spent in retail stores "by the
consumer went to the chain stores. The small chains with two to five
stores comprise more than half the total number of chains hut operated
less than 5$ of the total numher of stores, while the chains with one
thousand or more stores comprised less than Vf> of the chains hut operated
more than one-half of the stores and earned ahout hO'jo of the total sales.
The three largest national grocery store chains, namely, The
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, The Kroeger Grocery and Baking
Company, and The Safeway Stores Inc. operated during 1330, nearly 25,000
grocery stores and earned an aggregate sales of $1, 600,000,000. The Great
1. Final report of the FTC. -in 1929, p. 7
2. "Other types" include; mail order houses, road side markets etc.

7Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company operated 15, 73^ of these stores with a
total sales of one billion sixty-five million dollars.
The above figures indicate how large the chain store systems
were and what percentage of the total retail sales they commanded.
The figures also serve as a basis for comparison between the holdings
of independents and chains and show the extent of control each group
has over the retail market.
In a comparative study made by the Bureau of Social and Business
Research^-, in the city of Buffalo, New York, it was revealed that the
opening rate of independent stores in that city was much higher than that
of chain stores but that the rate of closings among independents was
nearly as high as the opening rate, whereas the rate of closings among
chains was roughly one-fourth their opening rate. Observing this fact from
a nation wide point of view, we can assume that this one fact accounts for
some of the great differences in the total number of stores operated by
each group.
We have so far discovered the size and the extent of sales
control exercised by the chain organizations* Let us now examine the
methods they used in obtaining this end.
B. METHODS OF GROWTH
The first method generally used by chains is internal expansion.
The expansive power of their organization manifests itself in the opening
1. University of Buffalo, Business Research Bulletin-Mar. 1930

of now stores as distinguished from acquisition of stores already in
existence under other ownership. During the thirty year period, 1900
to 1930, 1.597 chains opened 51 1 5^5 new stores and acquired 6,1+75 or a tot
of 58.0*10. In short this means that 89 per cent represents actual
opening of new stores. Che Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, the
largest rata.il grocery dealer in the world, has "built up its chain of
stores almost entirely "by opening new stores.
*
Growth through acquisition and consolidation has not been a
great factor of chain store expansion, for, as indicated ahove, only 11
per cent of the total number of new stores were acquired in this manner.
Acauisitions as a whole were predominately of other chains rather than of
independent stores.
A third method used in the growth and expansion of the chain
organizations was. by the introduction of mass production and mass move-
ment of goods. Most chains operate their own factories and warehouses,
therefore they are able to produce and distribute merchandise at a cheaper
rate than the independent dealers. They save on freight and storage
expenses, therefore they can get the needed commodities into the hands of
the consumers cheaper and at a great saving to all concerned.
The fourth, and perhaps the one method which caused most of
the criticism "by the smaller retailers, is the buying methods of the
chains. Their ahility to obtain goods at a much lower rate than their
competitors gives them a decided advantage over the latter and is an
outstanding feature in their growth and development.
1. Statement hy the Company President in a hearing "before PTC
investigating committee.

9In this manner they can obtain quantity discounts and other purchasing
concessions which are not available to small dealers.
It was alleged by the complainents that chains used "threats
and coercions" in obtaining buying privileges from manufacturers. The
Federal Trade Commission1 found that, from a total of 129 manufacturers
questioned, ~[6 admitted that they gave preferential treatment in some form
or other to chains. Thirty-three admitted that chains threatened to quit
purchasing from them if special privileges were not granted. Twenty-three
out of the thirty-three ststed that they had yielded to the demands of the
chains.
The question of whether or not the methods used by chains in
obtaining their merchandise was illegal is not for us to decide here. Our
purpose is to show that certain definite tactics were used by the majority
of the group.
The duty of determining whether the policies and practices adopted
by chain organizations was up to the courts, hence we will now examine
the two existing statutes to determine what legal steps could be taken to
regulate the alleged violations by chain organiz?tions
.
C. CHAIN ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The cases which have been brought into the courts charging chains
with a violation of the Sherman Act were dismissed, for the courts found
that they could not take jurisdiction. The provisions of this act does
not permit the courts to take jurisdiction where there is an absence of
evidence of an attempt to create a monoply for the purpose of eliminating
competition.
1. S-e FTC's Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, p. 7
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In the Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v Bondurant (2^7 US 282) the
court attempted to apply the "agency doctrine"^-. It established
the facts that this chain organization operated a large warehouse from
which it supplied its various local cutlets, all of \/hich were not
within the hounds of one state. In applying the agency rule, the court
sought to show that the local outlets were the agents of the pa-refit coiiipany,
and, 9 such, Its acta were the seme as those of the parent. In this
manner the court sought to prove that the parent company was engaged in
interstate commerce, thus susceptible to jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act. The case was overruled for the facts did not support the agency
charge.
The charge was made by the chain store critics that the size of
the chain system, and the extent of control is exercised, made it a
monopoly. The evidence to -rove this charge was insufficient. By taking
a particular chain organization operating in e particular section, one
can establish facts to prove the existence of monopolistic conditions.
The conditions would be confined to a particular section of the country,
and therefore not susceptible to the Sherman Lav;. The Supreme Court, in
ruling on such a point, stated that, " concern may do all of the business
in its field of operation and have no competition without infringing
section 2 of the Sherman Act." In the case of US v International Harvester
d?m;: nv-v (P"7 ' 1 US ^he court stated that, "the law does ^ot make the mere
size of a corporation or the existence of unexerted power on its part an
Tl Sea also Biro'emp v Prthe Exchange Inc. (2F7 US 282) and Strafford v
Wallace (25? US %5) for interpretation of agency doctrine.
2. Sec. 2 of Sherman Act Interpretation in Strafford v Wallace, ibid
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cffense, when unaccompanied by unlawful conduct In the exercise of its
powers
.
Because of the rulings in the above mentioned cases, the Federal
Trade Commission concluded that the Sherman Act was not the type of Law
needed to regulate chain store activity. With this in mind, we move now
to the Clayton Act, to determine how it can be applied to chain store
activities.
B. CHAM STOBES UNDER THE CLAYTON
In an examination of the prevision of the Clayton Act, the
Federal Trade Commission found that only section 2 and 7 could be applied
to the chain store activity complained of.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in any transaction in or affecting such commerce, either
directly or indirectly to discriminate unfairly or unjustly
in price between different purchase of commodities, which
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within
the United States or any territor3r thereof, etc
The facts in the complaints issued to the commission against
chain organization^- did not support the charge that chains used
discriminatory prices to the extent to make it a violation of sec. 2
above. Although there existed differences in prices charged to chains,
the courts could not - establish jurisdiction of the cases at bar, there-
fore it was unable to analyze or decide upon them.
Section 7 deals with the acquisition and consolidation of the capital
stock of one corporation by another. It states that:
1. opcit.
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It is unlawful for any corporation engaged in interstate
commerce to acquire the capital stock of any other corpor-
ation likewise engaged where the effect may he to substan-
tially lessen competition "between them or tend to restrain
such commerce in any community, or section of the country
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
A noteworthy feature of this section is, that there is no
prohihition of acquisition hy corporations of the hysical properties
of competing corporations.
The authority granted to the Commission hy the Federal Trade
Commission Act does not give it power to order a divestiture of the
physical properties of a corporation even though they were acquired through
the voting of stock acquired in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.l
The estahlished facts outlined ahove, shows that the small
retailers could not obtain any legal support from the Clayton Act, there-
fore agitation for a new law, with provisions to cover the alleged wrong-
doings of the chains, was begun.
The Federal Trade Commission submitted its final^ report on the
chain store investigation, Decemher 1*+, 193^. This report substantiated
many of the charges made by the American Retail Federation for the small
retailers. The report confirmed facts that chains were engaged in unfair
trade practices; that they secured special "buying privileges, and sold
merchandise at a price less than the independents could. Chains also took
advantage of unlawful "brokerage fees, and obtained numerous selling and
advertising allowances which were not accorded to its competitors. The
report outlined the weaknesses of the existing laws and recommended that
amendments he made. Thus the groundwork for the Robins on-Patman Act was
laid.
1. See Federal Trade Commission Act - discussed in Zorn and Feldman
p. 101, also see FTC v Roladam Co. (285 US 6U3) and Standard Oil
T FTC. (282 Fed. 81-87)
2. See conclusions in the final report of the FTC. (chapter 9)
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CHAPTER II
THE ACT: ITS PURPOSE AMD PROVISIONS
In the previous chapter we have indicated some of the economic
conditions which formed the "background to the Robinson-Patman Act. We
presented facts to show that chains possessed large holdings and controlled
a high percentage of the sales income from the retail field. It was noted
that the methods used in acquiring these holdings were not always in strict
conformity with fair "business practices. The weaknesses of the two existing
laws that regulated commerce and trade were pointed out. The conclusions
of the Federal Trade Commission and its recommendations were also noted.
With this "brief "background, we turn now to a discussion of
the Rohinson-Patman Act and its provisions. A detailed treatment of all
the provisions and prohlems created "by the Act cannot "be discussed at
this time, however it is necessary to indicate the general aspects of the
Statute preliminary to a treatment of those phases which I consider are
relevant to the small retailer's problems.
THE ACT: (PUBLIC LAW NO. 692-..;7Uth CONGRESS)
To amend section 2 of the Act entitled "An Act to supple-
ment existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies,
and for other purposes", approved October 15 » 191*+ » as
amended (U.3.C. , title lp, sec. 13), and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and Hoase of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress asser.bled
,
That section 2 of
the Act entitled "An Act to supplement existing laws against
unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes"
approved October 15i 191*+ • as amended (U.S.C., title 15, sec.
13), is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2 (a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce,
where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale

within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and
where the effect of such discrimination may he substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the "benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them": Provided , That nothing herein contained
shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance
for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered:
Provided, however , That the Federal Trade Commission may,
after due investigation and hearing to all interested parties,
fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it
finds necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of
commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in
greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on
account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of
monopoly in any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then
not he construed to permit differentials based on differences
in quantities greater than those so fixed and established:
And provided further
, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchan-
dise in commerce from, selecting their own customers in "bona
fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And provided
furth°r , That nothing herein contained shall prevent price
changes from time to time where in response to changing condi-
tions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods
concerned, such as hut not limited to actual or imminent deter-
ioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods,
distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in
discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.
"(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint
under this section, that there has been discrimination in price
or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting
the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall
be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and
unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission
is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
Provided, however
,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent
a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that
his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to
any purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low
price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished
by a competitor.

"(c) That it shall he unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to
receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage,
or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu there-
of, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or
purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other
party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or
other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in
fact for or in "behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect
control, of any party to such transaction other than the person
by whom such compensation 3s so granted or paid.
"(d) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value
to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course
of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any
services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in
connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for
sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or
offered for sale by such person unless such payment or consider-
ation is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or
commodities.
"(e) That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in
favor of one ourchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of
a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by con-
tracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the fur-
nishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processin
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such comrodity so
purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportion-
ally equal terms.
"(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such comnerce, knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this
section.
"
Sec. 2. That nothing herein contained shall affect rights of
action arising, or litigation pending, or orders of the Federal
Trade Commission issued and in effect or pending on review, based
on section 2 of said Act of October 15, 191^, prior to the effectiv
date of this amendatory Act: Provided
,
That where, prior to the
effective date of this amendatory Act, the Federal Trade Commission
has issued an order requiring any person to cease and desist from
a violation of section 2 of said Act of October 15, 191^, and such
order is pending on review or is in effect, either as issued or
as affirmed or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction,
and the Commission shall have reason to believe that such person
has committed, used or carried on, since the effective date of this

i6
amendatory Act, or ia committing, using or carrying on, any
act, practice or method in violation of any of the provisions
of said section 2 as amended "by this Act, it may reopen
such original proceeding and may issue and serve upon such
person its complaint, supplementary to the original com-
plaint, stating its charges in that respect. Thereupon the
same proceedings shall he had upon such supplementary complaint
as provided in section 11 of said Act of October 15, 131*-', • If
upon such hearing the Commission shall he of the opinion that
any act, practice, or method charged in said supplementary
complaint has "beer, committed, used, or carried on since the
effective date of this amendatory Act, or is "being committed,
used or carried on, in violation of said section 2 as amended
"by this Act, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall
state its findings as to the facts and shall issue and serve
upon such person its order modifying or amending its original
order to include any additional violations of law so found.
Thereafter the provisions of section 11 of said Act of Octoher
15, 191^ » as to review and enforcement of orders of theCommis-
sion shall in all things apply to such modified or amended
order. If upon review as provided in said section 11 the court
shall set aside such modified or amended order, the original
order shall not he affected thereby, hut it shall he and remain
in force and effect as fully and to the same extent as if such
Sup lemontary proceedings had not "been taken.
Sec. 3« I* shall he unlawful for any person engaged- in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to he a party to, or assist in,
any transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates
to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that,
any discount, rehate, allowance, or advertising service charge
is granted to the ptirchaser over and ahove any discount, rehate,
allowance, or advertising service charge availahle at the time
of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a se le
of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract
to sell, goods in any part of the United States at prices lower
than those exacted hy said person elsewhere in the United States
for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a
competitor in such part of the United States, or tc sell, or
contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the
purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
Any ".erson violating any of the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction thereof, he fined not more than $5,000 or
irprisoned not more than one year, or hoth.
Sec. k. Uothing .in this Act shall prevent a cooperative Associa-
tion from returning to its memhers, producers, or consumers the
wh^le, cr any part of, the net earnings or surolus resulting
from its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases
or sales from, to, or through the association.
Approved, June 19, 193 6.

A. ITS PTOPCS3S
The purpose of the Eobinscn-Fatman Act is to further protect
trade and commerce from the restraints and inequalities imposed by undue
differences as "between customers. "It is to preserve equality of oppor-
tunity to engage in trade wherein the regards are apportioned on
considerations such as, duality of goods, efficiency, industry and the like.
A direct and perhaps a more terse statement of its purposes is, "a law to
stop sellers from unfairly discriminating "between customers or double-
crossing competitors with indirect concessions.
The fundamental objectives of the law as intended "by Congress
are: that no buyer should be given any discriminatory price that v/ill
injure competition; that no buyer should receive any part of the commission
normally paid to brokers; that allowances or payments for advertising
and promotional work should not unfairly discriminate between customers,
and that special services 'for customers such as the extension of credit
must not discriminate between customers.
3
In an analysis of the bill, Congressman Logan of the House
Judiciary Committee, stated the following as a general objective for the
Law, "it proposes to amend section 2 of the Clapton Act, so as to suppress
more effectively discriminations between customers of the same seller
not supported by sound economic differences in their business positions
or in the cost of serving them."^
T~. Congrea sional Report Tel. SO pp 322° - 3230
2. Hobirson—Patmen guide book - forward
}. Zorn and Feldma.n-Buc 4 ress under Saw Price Laws — pp 379
U. Ecuse Judiciary F.epcrt Ho. 2267
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B. ITS PP.OVTSIQKS
The first basic provision of the Robinson-Patmar. Act is that
"prohibiting price discriminations "between customers of a seller."
This provision however, is subject to a number of modifications. It
is designed to reach and regulate the competitive relations between a given
seller and his different customers and to limit price differentials between
them.l All differentials are not unlawful, for in the absence of the
following circumstances the Law is inoperative^;
1. There must be a discrimination "between two or more
customers of the same seller.
2. The difference in price must be made in commodities
of like grade and quality
3. Cne of the purchases involved must be in interstate
commerce
h. The commodities involved must have been sold for use,
consumption or resale within the United States or its
possessions, ard not for the purpose of export.
5. The transaction must involve the sale of commodities
and not for the sales of services
6, Even if the above factors a,re present, a discrimination
is not unlawful, unless in addition to the foregoing,
its effect may:
a. Substantially lessen competition in the line of
commerce
b. Tend to create a monopoly in a line of commerce
c. Injure, destroy, or prevents competition:
(1) "with the person who grants the discrimination
(2) With or among any of its customers
(3) With j)erson who knowingly receives the discrimin-
ation.
(U) With or among any of his customers
(5) With or among the customers of either of them.
1. cpcit.
2. opcit.

IS
The presence of the "basic elements, listed a"bove, does not "by
itself make a price differential a violation of section 1(a). Tor a full
description of the workings of this section, see chapter IV, paragraph A.
The "brokerage provision is not original vith the Robinson-
Patman Act; it was included in the Clayton Act and had a "bearing upon
the payment of commissions and allowances "by persons engaged in interstate
commerce. It was written into the Rohinson-Pa.tman Act and the phrase,
"except for services rendered" was addedj
This provision prohibits "both the seller and the "buyer from
granting to or receiving from the opposite party either directly or
indirectly, through the medium of a controlled agency any "brokerage or
commissions, "except for services rendered." Also it is directed against
all discriminatory price reduction effected through the guise of "brokerage
discounts. For a clear description of how this section works see chapter
17, paragraph B. (infra).
The criminal prevision of the Robins on-Patiaan Act is an
entirely new feature and is not an amendment 2 0f the Clayton Act. This
provision was taken "bodily from the Borah-Van iluys "bill, (S.^7~:-l) • It
was incorporated in the Robirson-Patman Law as a criminal provision and
makes three pretices criminal.
They are:
1. Being a party to or assisting in any transaction of
sale which discriminates, to the knowledge of the extor,
against competitors of the purchaser "by the granting of
any allowance or advertising service charge to the
purchaser which is not available to the purchaser's
competitors at the time of the transaction in respect to
the sale of goods of like gra.de, quality and quantity.
1. See text of the Act for other provisions (Paragraph 1 supra)
2. This section of the R.P.A. is the original Borah-Van Nuys Bill.
See explanation of Sec. 3. Vol. 20 cong. Record p. 9§6l.

2. Selling or contracting to sell goods in any part of
the United States at a price lower than the vendor exacts
elsewhere in the United States, when the same is "for
the purpose of destroying competition.
3. Selling or contracting to sell goods at unreasonably
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition,
or eliminating the competitor.
CHAPTER III
ARGUMENTS PGR AKD AGAINST THE ACT
In chapter I
1
we have discussed the outstanding features of the
Robins on-Patman Act. It is needless to say that some of them are contro-
versial and, as such, have given rise to much comment both within congres-
sional circles and by outside economic, business, and legal analysts.
Some of the arguments both for and against this act are well founded and
might well be the turning point in any case before the Commission. Evid-
ence of this fact may be substantiated by a cursory reading of the rulings
in cases already heard before the Pederal Trade Commission and the Supreme
Court. (See chapter IV infra)
This law, like many others, has lead to results which were not
necessarily anticipated by its fracers. These consequences are for the
most part secondary in nature and are not fully substantiated by cases in
evidence, but nevertheless I feel that the following list will reveal the
basis for some of the arguments against the act: '
1. Increase of distributor's brands at expense of manu-
facturer's brands.
2. Increase in buying to order on specifications
3. Adoption of other arrangements net strictly sales
k. Possible increase in prices for distributor's brands
5» Increase in manufacturing by distributors
1. Compiles from the various comments made in opposition to the act

6. Shifts .in sources of supply:
a. Contracting by large buyers for entire .output
of smell sellers
b. Choice by sellers between classes of customer"
(by function, quantity and method)
7. Encouragement to keep business within stste lines
8. Switch to c* onprptive form of organisation
9. Deliverste concealment of prices offered to eompet iters
10. Increase in the practice of confronting manufacturers
with the lowest orices available to large buyers any-
where in the country.
11. Tiscrir.ination against small buyers, even though not
required, increase in ^rice on sm?"'"' quantities by
wic^oread upp of quantity discount" , also an inten-
sified analysis of co<*t resulting fr^m snail scale
transact! or.s
.
12. Requirement that all differentials be made on the basis
of quantity and method, that is by character of buying
rather than by character of customer's selling.
13. Reduction in the use of demonstrators and (push money
for salesmen) 2 bocan.se of difficulty of promotional treat-
ment
15. Prevention of variation in delivery service (either
delivered or f. o.b. prices) legal, but maybe requirements
for uniformity on one side cr the ether.
explanatory notes in ap endix.
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16. Practical necessity that discounts "be uniform
17. Curtailment of activities or organizations specializing
in "buying
18. Discouragement of the use of company owned "brokerage
services (some of these offer a legitimate service to
customers in the form of sales and costs research)
Another result that was hardly forseen "by the authors of this
act in the loss of a reliable source of supply "by small retailers; for
some manufacturers have decided to confine their sales to one class of
"buyers rather than run the risk of violating some parts of this law.
e.g. (Bird and Sons FTC rulings Ho. 2$37« Others have chosen to concentrate
risks on large customers only, or have increased costs to those sellers who
solicit trade from small customers. Some manufacturers are ahle tc
dispose of their total productions through a single channel of distribution
or class of customers, e.g. (through mail order houses or lar chain outlets).
The points listed ahove have arisen since the passage of the Act.
Some of them were prchahly anticipated "by critics of the Law, "but to have
prevented them would have required the inclusion of clauses which would
have made the Act a rigid price and distribution control measure, rather
than a regulator of "business policies and practices. 1
In addition to the above named weaknesses, other criticisms
were offered by members of the House Judiciary Committee lii opposition
speeches on the Act.
2
1. For full discussion of the hill see report of House Judiciary-Report
No. 2227 • also see Congressional Record, Vol. SO, p. 55^1
2. See explanatory remarks "by Congressman Utterhack in Zorn & Feldman-
Business under new price Laws. pp. U03-^15»
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A. CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION
In a hearing "before the House Judiciary Committee on the (new
section 2 (a-f) and section 3) of the Robins on-Patman Act, Congressman
Celler (author of the minority opposition) stated that he objected to the
hill for:
"It contains many inconsistences and courts will have a
devil's own job to unravel the tangle. In an endeavor to
get some sort of an agreement, the so-called Borah-Van Nuys
provision of the Senate hill were grafted on to the House
hill and we have what might he called in common parlance a
•Lodge podge 1 hill and when you attempt to read them together
you have the greatest difficulty."
In my opinion, the ambiguities referred to by the Congressman
form the basis for many of the objections made by businessmen who seek to
operate their enterprises within the meaning of the Robinscn-Patman Law.
Speaking further in opposition to the bill, Congressman Celler
said:
"this bill bears heavily against farmers and cooperatives,
therefore the American Parm Bureau Pederation, the National
Grange, the National Cooperative Association and the Secre-
tary of Agriculture have voiced emphatic opposition to the bill."
These groups mentioned by the Congressman, represent a large
group of sellers who are directly affected by the "meet competition"^
clause. The meet-competition cla.use was one of the obstacles to enforcement
of the Clayton Act. 2 In the Robinson-Patman Act the trick wording
"differing in method" phrase was added to it. This makes the Act more
confusing, for this seems to outlaw legitimate quantity disccunts.
Senators Logan and Robinson have denied the accusation that section 2(a)
1. See explanatory notes.
2. Section 2 of the Clayton Act allows prices tc be lowered to meet
competition

2k
outlaws quantity discounts, tat their statements only go as far as the
records in Congress and have had no weight in later decisions made "by the
Federal Trade Commission or the Supreme Court.
*
In opposition to section 2(c) and the words "except for services
rendered, Congressman Celler said:
"that means if actual "brokerage service is rendered it must
he allowed and paid for; either must he reflected in price
or discount allowance. Many respectahle and honcrahle "busin-
ess houses have brokerage department or have organized separ-
ate entities which they may own in whole or in part and perform
legitimate "brokerage functions; which departments or entities
expend money in research, investigation, experimentation, and
advertising. Yet if they he directly. or indirectly connected
with the seller or "buyer, no "brokerage allowance ma.y he made
although in the language of the inserted words 'services' were
rendered. We have come to a pretty pass in this country when
a person cannot he paid for rendering legitimate services
simply hecause he does not happen to he in a certain line of
"business. Under this same reasoning it would he quite logical
to prohihit a store from altering garments for customers hecause
he is not in the tailoring "business, and if we continue on this
road we will surely end up with legislations requiring the con-
surer to deal with tailors for certain work, independent auto-
mohile repairment for other things, and so on, and with companies
unahle to truck their own goods hecause there are separate
trucking companies." (remarks hy Congressman Celler "before the
House Judiciary Committee)
From the remarks made hy the Congressman, one can get an idea
why the P.ohins on-Patman Act has caused unrest among hoth huyers and
sellers and forms the "basis for other criticisms from outside sources.
B. OUTSIDE COMMENTS
The opposition voiced hy some of the noted authorities suggests
that the Act does not remedy the situation, hut rather complicate s it more
so. Por an example; Mr. E. P. learned and Mr. Nathan Isaacs, in an article
1, See Congressional Records Vcl. SO, pp 95^1* also Zorn and Felman.
opcit. pp. hlk m
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written for the Harvard Business Review^-, states that:
"the Robins on-Patman Act suffers from many causes of ambiguity:
it pretends to "be what it is net when it puts forward a check-
on competition in the guise of an antitrust law; it comhines
for the sake of compromise what are really two statutes inde-
pendently developed without mailing any effort tc render them
consistent; it assumes a great many propositions ahout "business
practices, some of which are obviously untrue; and it attempts
to extend the Federal power over matters that have heretofore
"been considered intrastate."
Notwithstanding the fact that the Dill does contain two indepen-
dently developed section2, I submit the thought that there did exist an
evil in the form of ahuse of competitive power and that the comhining of
these two "bills was done with the desire to remove that evil.
3
Mr. Learned and Mr. Isaacs further stated that:^
"this hill is "based on the recognition that competition
is not necessarily at all times and in all of its
manifestations a social good. But while serving this
major purpose an experiment of this kind must he carefully
watched for its incidental results; its social and economic
dislocations; its pressure upon "businessmen to seek new
escapes for the purpose of avoiding if not evading new
pressures. w
Another criticism of the Act was made "by Dr. Willard L. Thorp.
In an article for Dunn's Monthly Review, he recognized the "bill as a
reaction to "basic competitive relationships which have taken new aspects
under theimpact of the depression, thus he says that, "the Act is "bewildering
and confusing in many of its legal aspects however, it seems fairly clear
in some of its "broader economic implications and intentions. The immediate
1. Harvard Business Review - pp. 158, Vol. 15
2. Robins on-Patman Act and the Borah-Vr., l:uys Bill, (combined)
3. Abuses consists of unlawful price discriminations and unearned
brokerage fees.
U. Explanatory remarks by Cong. Utterback-Zorn and Peldman pp. iL03.
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impact of the Lav: falls on the price structure. The "behavior which it
condemns is in the field of individual pricing policies."
The import of the above criticisms is that the Act is designed
to correct the disorganized price structure, "but, in doing so it involves
other unrelated "business policies thereby rendering it confusing and
inapplicable to existing conditions.
Another noteable criticism made by Dr. Thorp is that, "this
Act will give the purchaser the ri c;ht to know the price structure
of the seller, and if such knowledge is withheld he can apply to
the Federal Trade Commission for aid." This practice could prove
detrimental to the harmonious relationship between the two groups.
The general opinion of the opposition is that they are in
sympathy with the small retailer, for the evidence uncovered by
the Federal Trade Commission proves that he is a victim of the agressive
powers of large competitors, but the opponents feel that the Robins on-
P?trcan Act, unless administered wisely is "too ambiguous" to be helpful
to them.
C. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR TEE ACT
It has been charged that the Robins cn-Patman Act was the results
of the efforts of a smell group of narrowly interested wholesalers and
lobbists and a few uninformed lawyers. That charge is true in so far
as the lobby work is concerned, nevertheless if many members of Congress
had not sensed a widespread popularity of such a legislation among their
constituents, it is unlikely that the lobby work would have attained its
ends. Consequently the proponents of the Robins on-Patman Bill obtained

widespread support "both in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Speaking in defense of the Act "before the House Judiciary
Committee, Congressman Utterhack stated that:
"The purpose of this proposed legislation is to restore, so
far as possible, equality of opportunity in "business "by
strengthening the antitrust laws and "by protecting trade
and commerce against unfair trade practices and unlawful
price discrimination, and also against restraint and
monopoly for the "better protection of the consumer, workers,
independent producers, manufacturers, merchants and other
"businessmen.
"
The discrimination referred to "by the Congressman as "being
unfair, consists of: price differentials on like "brands, the sale of
goods of like quality to large retailers at a cheaper rate than the
charged smaller distributors, the unlawful use of private brands and a
difference in quantity discounts allowed.
Section 2(a) of the Rohinson Patman Act prohibits any practices whose
results is to substantially lessen competition for it states:
"where the effect of such discrimination maybe substantially
to lessen competition of tend to create a monopoly a
monopoly in the line of commerce, or injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the "benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them."
In explanation of this section, Senator Logan stated that,
"section 2(a) attaches to competitive relations "between a given
seller and his several customers, and this clause is designed to
extend its scope to discriminations "between interstate and intra-
state customers, as well as those purely intrastate."
The modifications of section 2(a) are expressed in the first
provision of the Act^, and reads, "that nothing herein shall prevent
1. Sec. 2(a) of the Rodins on-Patman Act.

differentials which make only due allowances in cost of manufacturing,
sale or delivery resulting fromoffering method or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold are delivered."
This provision is designed to allow for some price differentials
as indicated, hut it is difficult to see how differences in cost can
occur except "by reason of "differing in methods or quantities in which
commodities are made, sold and delivered." This provision seems to take
away all of the power of section 2(a) thus making the entire section very
confusing.
The main reason that agitation for the amendment to the
Clayton Act arose out of the general "belief among small retailers^-,
that mass "buyers in the field of distribution were obtaining lower prices
from manufacturers "by the use of pressure and inducement of large
quantity orders? The manufacturers could not resist and in fact had
become helpless un^er large order pressure and were therefore compelled
to load their unabsorbed costs as well as their profits upon the smaller
and less powerful customers.
3
In the opinion of the proponents of the bill, this supposedly
widespread unfair price discrimination was pricing the small merchants
out of the business and tending to create monopoly by attempting to
concentrate the distribution of merchandis in the hands of few.
1. Final reoort of the FTC. (Conclusion)
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
«
CHAPTER IV
SOME LEADING CASES TRIED U1TDER THE R03INS01T-PATMAE LAV/
The duty of administering the Rohinson-Patmnn Act is in the
hands of the Federal Trp.de Coran ssion. The Commission hegen its analysis
of the controversial aspects of the Act "by filing cases which involved
facts that were essentially pertaining to the most debatable aspects of
the Law.
The following are abbreviated reports of some of the formal
cases^- decided "by the Commission. These are "by no means all of the
cases which have appeared "before the Commission, hut they are a
sufficient numher to indicate the nature of the unfairness in the policies
and practices^ for which the Rohinson-Patman Act is designed to prohihit.
The first of these cases was a proceeding "brought against
the Kraft-Phoenix Corporation3, charging unlawful price discrimination
in the use of quantity discounts and volume discounts in sales to retailers
The company granted a 5$ discount on single purchases of $5 or more and to
group "buyers who jointly purchases $100.00 worth or more in a single week.
The company also granted certain discounts on loaf cheese, depending upon
the quantity purchased at one time.
It was shown that these disccunts were available to all hut
the very smallest "buyers. Any retailer, for example, who purchased
1. Federal Trade Commission rulings
2. See explanation in Chapter II, Par. A.
3. ihid. Docket No. 3023
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packaged cheese or salad dressing in quantities of more than $5.00
each week was able to secure a discount of 5$ "below the price quoted
to smaller "buyers.
In dismissing this complaint the Commission "based its ruling
primarily upon the fact that the discounts in question and in quantities
we^e too small to inflict any "perceptible" injury to competing retailers
who did not receive this discount. Thus it was found that the maximum
possible amount of discrimination against retailers who purchased less
than $5«00 weekly was $6.50 annually. This amount, the Commission ruled,
was too unsubstantial to give it any serious competitive advantage.
In addition to this finding the Commission also ruled that in
ell probability differences in cost were adequate to justify the discounts
in question, under the cost proviso of section 2-A of the Act. The commis-
sion indicated that it would adopt a reasonable polic -"- in the question of
allocation of cost and would not require cost differences with mathematical
precision, (see full renort in I^C v Kraft Co. infra)
The second complaint was brought against Montgomery Ward and Co.,
Bird & Son, and the Bird Floor Covering Sales Corporation. The complaint
in this case alleged that the two Bird concerns sold to Montgomery Ward
Company, to wholesales, and to independent retailers. It charged that
the prices charged to Montgomery Ward was lower than that to independent
retailers by as much as 15$ to 18$. The complaint was dismissed. The case
turned squarely upon the nuestion of cost justification. The Commission
found that the saving in cost involved in dealing with Montgomery Ward &
Co. , as compared with independent retailers was, over 28$ while the maximum
discrimination was less than 20$.

The record in this case discloses, In addition, the occurrence
of one of the anticipated effects?- of the Rod ins on-Patman Act. The
facts are; that somtime prior to the passage of the Act the two Bird
Companies had commenced to curtail their dealings with the independent
retailers. The enactment of the law apparently accelerated the develop-
ment of this policy-, and within a few months after its passage no goods
were "being sold direct to retailers while jobbers and mail-order houses
were being quoted the same net prices. The Commission held that, the seles
policy of the companies, in eliminating direct sales to retailers was an
entirely proper exercise of the right of customer selection expressly
granted by the Act. 2 (ITC v Bird and Montgomery Ward) Docket 2937
.
The third case was a complaint brought against the Hollywood
Hat Company, alleging that this company was charging a substantially
lower price to one very large syndicate buyer than to any of its other
customers, namely $21.00 to $3^.00 a dozen to the syndicate and £3. 00 to
$6.00 a dozen more on the same hats to other buyers. The respondents
made no attempt to justify this price difference on the basis of cost and,
accordingly the commission issued a cease and desist order. The complaint
also charged that the use of unfair methods of competition, included the
substitution of cheaper hats for better ones without the knowledge or
consent to buyers.
The interesting part of this case is the failure of the
respondents to make any attempt to justify the price differences on the
1. This fact has been pointed out in Chspter III as one of the criticisms
of the EPA.
2. ibid px) 126.
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"basis of cost. The facts do not indicate that it would have teen possible
for them to have shown cost differences equal to the differences in price;
nevertheless some differences undoubtedly exir-ted. The fact that the FTC
did not inquire into the cost differentials, indicates a policy that,
"it will not decide upon facts that are not pleaded in defense." (FTC.
v Hollywood Hat Co. Docket No. 3030)
.
The fourth case deals with what is probably the most controversial
clause of the Act: section 2-C which prohibits the payment of brokerage
by one party to the transaction, except for services rendered, to the other
party to the same transaction or to any one under the control of the other
party.
1
In this case, the complaint alleged that the Biddle Company acted
as buying agent for a large number of concerns and that for these services
received a substantial monthly fee from such concerns. In return for this
fee the Biddle Company furnished its clients with detailed market informa-
tion. It also acted as buying agent for these companies and purchased
merchandise for their account from a large number of sellers. The sellers
paid brokerage fees to Biddle, who in turn passed them on intact to its
buying clients.
The Commission Ruled that in this case the payment of brokerage
by these sellers to Biddle was violation of Section 2-C of the Act. It
found that Biddle was under the control of its buying clients and that it
did not render any services to the seller which would justify the payment
of brokerage. The case turned largely upon the Commission's interpretation
1. Section 2-c of EPA.

of the phrase, "except for services rendered." It sustained the view
that no one under the control of the "buyer could render sales services
tc the seller within the meaning; of the section. The Commission plated
further that "the services rendered "by Biddle to sellers were incidental
to the particular purchase and sale transaction and that such sale
services were donated "by the Biddle Company to the seller."
Biddle ar^ealed to the circuit court, "but the decision of the
FTC was upheld* The ruling of the circuit court was thp.t, "sellers
cannot pay "brokerage to "buyers of their representatives for selling
services." (See circuit court's decision in the Biddle case - FTC v Biddl
?urc!-»sir!g Com-oany- Docket 3032)
The Commission handed down the orders in the four cases reviewed
ahove cn July 13, 1537* Is. two of these cases, the complaints against
the respondents were dismissed and in the other two, the cease and disist
orders were issued. Each of these cases illustrates the Commission's
attitude toward a different phase of the Act.
The following cases are divided into four main categories,
namely, c^ses on price discrimination, cases involving "brokerage questions
cases on discriminating with advertising mone Tr
,
and cases involving
service discriminations. There will he given a sufficient number of facts
in each case to ena.hle the reader to recognize the prohlercs involved. The
ruling of the Federal Trade Commission will he cited after each set of
facts, plus the writer's comments and in this manner, it is hoped that a
definite conclusion can he made of the question of, "what can or cannot
he done under the Hohinson-P^tran Act. These cases are not picked in

the sequence in which they appeared on the Commission 1 s agenda hut are
chosen "because the facts involved illustrates the Commission's inter-
pretation of the c'if-^erent phases of the lav.
.A. CASKS OS PP.ICF DIStSRIMlJTATXOIJ
In the matter of H.C. Prill Company Inc. Docket So. 2?35:
The Irlll Manufacturing Company had a policy of allowing
cumulative discounts on the "basis of annual sales to large
customers while disregarding the purchases made "by smaller
companies engaged in the same competitive "business, and whose
aggregate annual purchases was not very high, hut some of
their individual purchases exceeded those of the large companies.
The FTC held that, "discounts are unlawful when based on total
purchases in any given period."
Comments-*-: Large "buyers often place small orders during a given period,
hut their aggregate volume far exceeds that of smaller buyers, thus
according to Brill, the latter group is not entitled to discounts. The
FTC overruled this contention and applied section 2 (a) provision 1 of
the Robins on-Pa.tman Act. The Commission's order establishes the fact that
quantity discounts "based on prohable savings in the cost of manufacture,
sale or delivery resulting from differing methods or quantities must he
figured on individual transactions and not on total volume, and hopes for
volume over an agreed period of time.^ (see similar rulings in FTC v
American Optical Company and FTC v Simmons Co.)
In the matter of the Master Lock Company:
The Master Lock Company granted a 57° additional discount
tc customers whose annual purchases exceeded $10,0(50. TMs
discount was predicated on the "belief that this "business
was done at a lover cost then was the "business taking less
than ^10,000 per year.
1 Trade practice & price law. pp. 12U "by John V/. Norwood.
2 Comments of the author.

The ITC held that, "discounts, "based on cumulative orders over
a period of time and granted retroactively to all purchasers when total
reached $10,000 in a year, are discriminatory ."
Comments: The facts do not support the point contended for "by the Lock
Company, for customers talcing less than $10,000 annually frecraer.tly placi
larger individual orders than those taking more than this amount. There
is no saving on the individual orders and no facts which support a
•i-ffering in cost of manufacturing, sale or delivery charge, therefore
retroactive discounts on this has is are discriminatory, (see FTC v A&P-
infra)
In the matter of the Sherwin-Williams Company:
Discrimination in the sale of paint is the charge against
the Sherwin-Williams Company and two of its wholly-owned
suhsidiaries, Lowe Bros. Company and John Lucas and Company.
The complaint states that the three granted quantity discounts
"by permitting main offices of some chain lumher yards to
pool orders of unit stores; that a flat 10^ discount was
granted to some chain yards irrespective of the size of the
order; that Sherwin-Williams accumulated orders of some of
its distributors and dealers for a time sufficiently long
enough to enable the buyers to earn maximum discounts on
orders less than carload quantities
.
The FTC held that, "delayed hillings to special customer^
to get a greater quantity discount is illegal."
Comments: In addition to reestablishing the ruling held in the -matter
of the Master Lock Company, the Commission also applied section 2 (a)
of the Eohirs^-Patrcan Act. This section states that, "no price differ-
entials are permitted on goods of like quality and like grade."

In the matter of Champion Spark Plug Company:
Widely varying prices in the sale of spark plugs is
charged "by the FTC in its charge against the Champion
Spark Plug Co&ipany. The FTC alleged that Champion sells
its plugs to automohile manufacturers for original equip-
ment at six cents per plug cr less while prices charged
to purchasers of like quality and grade, who resell or
use them as replacement plugs range frnr twenty-three to
thirty-one cents per plug. The price of six ce^.ts is less
than the average cct to manufacture, sell and deliver.
The Champion Company alleged that, the sale of its product
In the replacement field '.epends largely on the extent
to which his product is used for original equipment. Adcpt-
tion of such an article on a well known auton;cbile is great
advertising value to the manufacturer.
The FTC held that, " A company cannot sell to some customers
for less than cost, just to promote repeat orders."
Comments: Champion claimed that prices charged automobile manufacturers
are to meet competition. This is legal; for according to the provisions
of the Pobinson-Patman Act," prices may be lowered to meet competition."
(adequate proof is necessary to sustain this charge) Price differentials
are legal when justified by savings. (FTC v Bird Floor coverings, supra)
Special prices to selected buyers are illegal when the buyers compete
with each other. (FTC's order against the Window Glass Manufacturers
Asr-r.) The FTC held that none of these decisions were applicable to the
Champion Spark Plug Company's case.
The cases reviewed above are indicative of how the Federal Trade
Commission interprets section 2(a) of the PoMnscn-Patman Act-- vhen
applying it to cases involving price discrimination charges.
Price discrmination section.

37
•Cases where price discrimination is permitted: See explanatory notes
in appendix.
3. PASSS IHYpLVDTG THE BEOKJBAGrJ! CTJ33T~ r ::
It shell he unlawful to pay or receive a commission, brokerage
or any other compensation, or anything in lieu thereof, to
the other party to the transaction or to his agent, or to an
intermediary directly or indirectly controlled by the other
party, (section 2(c) of the Robins on-Patman Act) 3e^ full
text of the Act in paragraph 2 of chapter II supra)
Section 2 (c) of the Robins on-Patman Act, or the "brokerage
section," has been a controversial matter because so many buyers were
operating their own brokerage affiliates, or receiving cash or other
benefits from central buying organisations which were really representing
buyers.
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company^, being the dominant
concern in the food business, showed an early interest in the brokerage
section of the Act, because it operated several buying agencies and engaged
in the practices Which the Robins on-Patnan Act declared unlawful. In a
test case^before the PTC all of the i^uWt ions appertaining tc brokerage*
were brought up, and the Commission held that A&P's practices were a
violation of the brokerage section and issued a cease and disist order. The
A&P appealed tc the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the decision of
1. PTC Locket To. 3031
2. Printer's Ink Feb. IS, 1936, p. 33
3. Allowances can be decent. . . .
ibid-Peb. 11, 1530, p. 17

The federal Trade Commission.
The following is a list 1 of the Rulings of the "brokerage
section made "by the Supreme Court in the A&F case.
1. Buyers can't "be paid for services rendered in connection
with purchasing^
2. Buyers may not "be compensated for services performed
by their agents
3« Buyers may not receive "brokerage or anything in lieu
thereof on own purchases
k. Brokerage for "services rendered" can be paid only
to a bona fide agent of principal
5. Sellers who employ no brokers cannot violate the
brokerage section
6. Seller who does not use any brokers has whatever price
latitude is permitted by section 2(a)
7. Salesmen may represent several sellers and still be
considered a salesman
£>. An agency may be a broker for one company and a
salesman for ancther3
9. Brokers who merchandise for own account are distributors
or super-jobbers
10. Sellers depending on direct buyers may not pay brokerage
on any sales
11. Cost plus contracts may require inclusion of brokerage
as a cost
12. Representatives of buyers may not be paid for incidental
services to the seller
1. Complied from dicta in the matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v FTC (106 F (2d) 667 1$33. cer. ien. Jan. l6, 1^0
2. Facts may alter holding, if proven substantially
3. FTC may investigate to determine if this is done to evade the RFA

13. No purchasing agent can claim "brokerage for services
to the seller
lH. Sellers can't pay "brokerage to "buyers or their represen-
tatives for selling services
15. Nothing in the Lav prevents "buyers from employing their
own brokers
16. It is illegal for the "buyer to pay "brokerage for the buyer
17. A company may not take "brokerage on goods purchased
for sale tc its subsidiaries
IS. Brokers representing seller can't give hi3 commission
to "buyer
19. Brokerage subsidiary may not collect brokerage on sales
made to a company controlling it
20. Produce jobber can't collect brokerage on sales to a
wholesale business he controls
21. Brokers v.ho merchandises on own account may continue
as a regular broker on other lines
22. Brokers cannot sell goods for a principal on a basis
of collecting overages
23. Seller's broker cannot legally pass any of his commission
to the buyer
2U. Seller employing brokers may not concede brokerage
to meet competition!
25. Sellers cannot sell through brokers in one territory
and concede brokerage to buyers in another
26. Packers may use different methods to sell different
commodities
27. It is illegal to pass brokerage on accomodation sales
28. Buyers are not guilty of violation just because the
original packer broke the Law
25. Good faith may be a deciding factor in determining
when the Law is inadvertently violated
1. For a full discussion of the brokerage section, see 88 University of
Fenna. Law Rev. 731-7U 6, 19^0. also see Biddle Purchasing Co. v FTC,
36 F (2d) 687, 1^39. Oliver Bros, v FTC, 102 F(2d) 263, 1939, and
International Shoe Co. v FTC 280 US 298
(I
t
30. It is unnecessary to prove injury to competition
under "brokerage section
C. CASES ON DISCRIMINATING- WITH ADVERTISING MOKE!
Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act states that:
It shall be unlawful to pay anything to a customer
as compensation for services or facilities furnished
by such customer unless s'TCh payment is available on
proportionally eaual terms to all other competing customers
(see full text of the act in Chapter II supra)
The following is a list^-f the Rulings on section 2 (d) made
by the Pe-deral Trade Commission in cases wherein the question of
discriminating in advertising money has arisen.
2
1. Payments for advertising must be for bona fide value
and not discriminatory
2. Pa7/ments for advertising a product must be offered
on proportionally equal terms
3. Percentage allowances must be available to customers
able and willing to perform
U. Payments for promotion are not allowances in lieu of
brokerage
5. Advertising allowances should not reflect brokerage
6. Advertising allowances must be in proportion to the
value of services rendered
7. Manufacturers must make his contracts and his promo-
tional payments available to all who can perform the
services
8. Payments for promotion is determined by the value to the
manufacturer
1. The facts are omitted; the question of discriminating in advertising
money usually arises as a side question in a case at the bar on some
other counts.
2. The cases in which the above instructions were given are:
Oliver Bros, v FTC, supra
Kraft Cheese Co. v PTC, supra
A & P v PTC, supra

hi
9. Payments must he proportionally equal only when customers
are in competition
D. DISCRIMINATING- IN SERVICES
Section 2 (e) of the Rchinson-Patman Act states that:
It shall he unlawful to discriminate in favor of one
purchaser against another "by furnishing any services
or facilities not accorded to all purchasers on pro-
portionally equal terms, (see text of act chapter II
supra)
The following is a list of the Rulings on section 2(e) made
hy the Federal Trade Commission in cases wherein the question of discrim-
inating in services has arisen.^-
1. It is unnecessary to prove injury tc competition
under the services section (section 2 (e)
2. Customers must "be treated alike when allowing delivery
charges
3« Must give special allowances for special services to
all competing customers
h. Special payments to wholesalers must he offered on
proportionally equal terms
5. It is illegal to discriminate "between "buyers hy
furnishing some with different sized packages
6. Demonstrators must he furnished on a proportionally
equal "basis
7. Cash discounts and terms of sale must apply equally
to all customers
SU Seller cannot discriminate "by delivering to one and
forcing competitor to pay freight
1. The facts are omitted; the cases in which the ahove instructions were
given are:
Oliver Bros, v FTC, supra
CP. Sauer Co. v FTC
FTC v General Motors and AC Spark Plug Co.
FTC v. Luxor Ltd.
A & P. v FTC, supra

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY CONCLUSION
The RcMnson-Patman Act is not a completely new type of
governmental regulation of "business. It represents, instead, an attempt
to define and amplify the price discrimination section of the Clayton
Act. As an amendment to this Act, which has "been on the statute "books
since 191^, the Rohins on-Patman Act "becomes an intergral part of the anti-
trust laws.
The groundwork for this Act was laid in an investigation of the
chain store practices conducted by the Federal Trade Commission. Congress
had "become increasingly concerned over the distress among small dealers
which resulted from the rapid growth of the chain stores and over the huge
concentration of "buying power in the hands of a few corporations.
The American Retail Federation took a leading part in the
preparation and agitation for the passage of the Rohins on-Patman Act
..
Some commentators charged that it was the influence of this group that
started the agitation against chain organizations. I cannot say whether
or not this is true, but the evidence shows that there was a widespread
feeling throughout the country that the tremendous growth of chain store
organizations was a social and economic evil which must "be curbed. The
facts uncovered "by the Federal Trade Commission supported this feeling,
thus I say that, sentiment was one of the major factors influencing Congress
to pees this law.
The general feeling "by the public, that "big "business, as such, was
"bad, and that it is rapidly destroying the small merchants, has existed
in this country since 18>30. The Sherman Act was passed "because of the

fear of monopolies. It was an attack on ""bigness" in selling, "but by
1$28 the focus had shifted from "bigness in selling to bigness in "buying.
The RobiUS OH"fStman Act V8.S "OclSS ed to control the latter so-called evil.
This Act is largely an expression of fear on the part of the small
retailer, rather than a political whim of a single trade association.
The purposes and provisions discussed in chapter II of this
study, may here "be summarized as four fundamental or main objectives.
They are to provide for:
1. an equitable "basis for customer classification
2. Uniform treatment for all customers falling within
a given classification
3. elimination of pseudo-brokerage, and
h. equal treatment of buyers in receipt of merchandising
services and allowances from sellers
The criticisms of the Act presented in chapter III have some
merit, for example, the charge made by Congressman Celler that, "the
bill contains many inconsistences," is well founded, for a cursory
reading of section 2(a) of the act will not give one a clear picture of
its intent and meanings if he is not well aware of the circumstances
preceding the passage of this Law. Another confusing aspect of the
Act is the inclusion of the Borah-Van Uuys' bill (section III). The
wording of this section, in many respects, duplicates that of section 2,
but it includes a penalty for violations. To read the two sections
together and get a clear meaning requires the help of an authority on
the Act.
nevertheless the above ambiguities have been overcome by a
careful analysis by the Supreme Court and the Federal Trade Comm:'. ssion.

In the cases tried under the Act, by these two authorities, all contro-
versial points pertaining to it have "been discussed. Ir. this study I
have presented those cases which I feel contained the most controversial
issues, and listed the cans and cannot s under each major section,
concurs I Oil
The theory "behind the passage of the Robinson-Fatman Act
lay in the general "belief that ""big "business" , as such, was "bad, and
was forcing the small retailer out of the distribution market. The
evidence available does not reveal the extent to which this was done.
There are figures to show the actual size of the chain store systems
and the percentage of the total retail sales which they commanded at
the time the agitation for the passage of this Law "began. There are no
figures to show the actual number of small failures that came about as
a direct result of chain store expansion, nor has it been adequately
proved that the business practices of chain organisations have directly
affected the survival of the small retailer.
The proponents of the bill based ^heir arguments on the state-
ment , that chain stores promoted unfair competition; that they obtained
special buying consessions, and received commissions and allowances which
were not actually earned. They stated further that, by the use of
coercive methods, chains have forced manufacturers to sell to them below
the cost to manufacture and deliver, and by so doing, forced the latter
to transfer his unabsorbed costs to the small retailer's account, thereby
working a hardship upon him. Evidence to prove this charge, if sufficiently

convincing, would he grounds for the passage of a law outlawing such
practices, however, as pointed out in chapter I (supra), only thirty-three
manufacturers have admitted that chains used coercion and none have
stated that they were forced to transfer costs to small retailers.
The expansion of chain-store systems was accomplished largely
"by opening of new stores, rather than the acouisition of independent
stores already in operation under other management. Mass production and
mass movement of goods from their own warehouses to their local outlets
have resulted in enormous savings to the chains, therefore they were
ahle to expand rapidly; offer additional services to the customers and
maintain a wide assortment of merchandise. Through rapid turnover of
inventories they have "been ahle to sell at a price lower than their
independent competitors, thus they have secured much trade that would have
ordinarily gone to the independents.
The Rohins on-Patman Act has for its purposes the prohibition
of price digermination; the elimination of unearned brokerage commissions;
the use of coercion and threats to secure price differentials, and the
unlawful acquisition of quantity and other discounts. In this study we
have assumed that these practices existed among chains, therefore we
have oroceded to show how the provisions of this Act accomplishes this
end, for herein lies the only justification for this type of lav;.
We have discussed the provisions of the act and presented
some of the pro and con arguments ahout it. This was done in order to
reveal the controversial aspect involved, and to show how they have "been

U6
interpreted. We have listed the cans and cannots as interpreted "by
the Supreme Court and the Federal Trade Commission, so that the reader
can get an idea of what each of the various provisions intend to regulate.
Our conclusion is that the Hooiftson-Patman Act is a regulator
of "business policies and practices as "between large and small retailers.
It promotes uniformity in "buying and selling practices therehy permitting
free competition to exist.
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Terms and Explanatory Notes
PROPORTIONATELY EQUAL TERMS: If a seller grants an allowance to one
customer he should grant the same to another, if purchases are under
identical circumstances; based upon the quantity of the purchase.
PUSH MONEY: Allowances given to salesmen who pass it out to their
customers to promote sales.
QUALITY DIFFERENCES: The act recognizes that there are certain types
of price differences which are not discriminating. Thus discrimination
oan only occur in the sale of goods of "like quality and grade."
MEET COMPETITION; The defendant may show as evidence that he cut prices
to meet competition. This is not an absolute defense even if a justifiable
meeting of competition is shown.
CUSTOMERCLASSIFTCATICN: The device of classifying customers by size of
potential business, giving each class an over-all discount with each
suceeding higher bracket,
DISCRIMINATION: As declared by the Robins on-Patman Act Sect. 2(a) "it
is an unlawful dealing with (sellers or buyers) in a manner to injure
competition in any line of commerce etc."
Notes
Permissible price dis eliminations occur where traceable savings in cost
to manufacture, sale, or delivery when these can be shown to result
from different methods of quantities in which the commodity is sold or
delivered to different customers, (subsection (a) of RPA.) (see also
Lawful discriminations under the Robins on-Patman Act - Dunn 1 3 Monthly
Review pp. 6-8, Oct. 1936.)
Discriminatory price cutting means the cutting of prices in selected
spots and to selected groups of buyers. It may be undertaken merely to
increase trade, or to crush competition. The most striking examples of
price cutting to crush competition are found in the petroleum refining
companies. (ETC v Standard Oil Co. 282 Eed. 81, 87.) TNEC (Temporary
National Economic Committee) report on the Meat-packing Industry. . .
Part I pp. 68.
Justifiable rebates have been made but in the notorous case of the
Standard Oil Co. (supra) the railroads granted Mr. Rockerfeller a price
much lower than that charged his competitors or made rebates when higher
prices was charged. (See Soman & Bach. . .Economic Analysis and Price
Policies .. .Section on price discrimination).
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